After 45 minutes of discussions, we came out with these voting rules for the Operating Agreement. What do you think?
The text of proposals must be written in English only and sufficiently detailed.
Each proposal shall be announced publicly via common DAO communication channels.
Each proposal must be open for the vote for at least 72 consecutive hours (3 days), but not longer than 168 consecutive hours (7 days).
At least 10% of all tokens in the current possession of the IPv4DAO Members shall participate in the vote.
Approval or consent of the majority (at least 51%) is required for the votes with two options (eg. “Yes” or “No”).
In case of a proposal with more than two options, approval or consent shall be granted to the option which was voted for by the highest number of tokens. In case of two or more options have the same highest number of votes, the proposal should be rejected.
I would suggest rephrasing “The text of proposals must be written in English only and sufficiently detailed” to “The text of proposals must be sufficiently detailed and written exclusively in English”
In case of a proposal with more than two options, approval or consent shall be granted to the option which was voted for by the highest number of tokens. In case of two or more options have the same highest number of votes, the proposal should be rejected.
should be:
In case of a proposal with more than two voting options, approval or consent shall be granted to the option which was voted for by the greatest number of tokens. In case of several options attaining the same greatest number of votes, the proposal shall be rejected.
[quote=“k-real, post:1, topic:18”]
At least 10% of all tokens in the current possession of the IPv4DAO Members shall participate in the vote for declaring the vote to be valid.
[/quote] - it’s just slight minor amendment, but I think we should clarify why we need this mentioned 10%
Also, we don’t have any protection against spam, in case someone submits multiple proposals to the vote.
We probably should define who could put the proposals for a vote.
IMHO we could do the following: Only members can put proposals to vote. Each member can have only one submitted proposal in the active voting state.
Only current members of IPv4DAO can submit a matter for a vote. A member can not submit a new matter for a vote while his previous submission hasn’t reached the end of the voting period.
I still doubt this condition “At least 10% of all tokens in the current possession of the IPv4DAO Members shall participate in the vote, if not - the proposal is rejected.” Ok, we agreed upon valid/not valid/rejected. However, there is one more issue. The matter is what is more important - is that a mass of tokens or a number of members ready to cast their votes? The wording “as is” defines that percentage of tokens is more important than the number of active members. On the one hand, it is fair enough, but, on the other hand - actively involved members are a driving power for our DAO. So, I have taken the liberty to offer the following one: “At least 10% of all IPv4DAO Members shall participate in the vote, if not - the proposal is rejected.”
Why it’s cool - because that means, that even if you are not in a group of powerful members with a lot of tokens, you also can define a further DAO’s step, if “big guys” don’t care about voting. It could bring an additional incentive for our potential members, coz you can invest relatively little money and at that influence decisions.
We can’t identify the real people behind the tokens.
For example, one person can disperse his tokens to multiple wallets and dilute the number of DAO members, which would require more participation in the vote.
Imagine having 100 people each having 10 tokens.
If we tie the vote to the members we will require 10 people to participate.
But if one member decides to imitate 10 people he could increase that number to 11.
If 10 members decide to do so, the required number will go up to 20 people.
if 50 → 60 people.
Therefore I would suggest sticking to the tokens only, as the rest is not cryptographically guaranteed.
“If we tie the vote to the members we will require 10 people to participate” - I would say at least 10 people to participate. However there is no limit for participation, so other members could also participate. That means, that eleventh guy with 12 tokens will beat a first one (who has 10 wallets with ten distributed tokens) and this eleventh guy will actually define an outcome, if only two of them participate to the certain vote. And more than that- scam price for the guy, who decides to control a voting process to lead it in a certain outcome would be the same, whether he put his tokens in one wallet or in different wallets. My amendment is not about voting power, it is just an other approach how to motivate a small buyers, for example.
I think your example is applied more to voting power, not participation.
Regarding the participation requirements:
I meant that a malefactor can obstruct the proposal by manipulating the minimum participation requirement.
Most DAOs already have quite low participation proportions.
If the malefactor can artificially increase the minimum participation requirements he could sabotage the vote.
For example, we have a DAO with 100 people and 1000 tokens.
About 15 members are usually active in the votes.
If a malefactor doesn’t want one of the proposals to be approved he would only need 100 tokens to simulate the population of 100 extra members.
That extra population will set the minimum participation requirement to 20 members.
If DAO can not engage 20 members in that vote - the proposal is automatically rejected.
Result: having 10% of DAO tokens allows you to reject any vote you don’t like.
That’s one of the attack vectors and I believe there may be others.
OK, so just to be clear, by “required” I meant that the condition of having at least 10% (tokens in my case, members in your case) should be met for the vote to not be rejected.